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The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized “the reality that criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” This is as true for defendants facing charges of robbery and extortion as for those charged with tax evasion, embezzlement, or securities fraud. Indeed, research has previously shown that nearly 97% of all federal convictions are secured through plea agreements—not jury verdicts.

Against this context, it is noteworthy that the Court recently declined to resolve a lingering circuit split involving the right of defendants to have their counsel seek such plea agreements. Specifically, the Court was asked to consider whether a defense attorney’s failure to pursue a plea agreement on behalf of a client could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment affords criminal defendants the right “to have the assistance of counsel” for their defense, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to mean effective counsel.

In Davis v. United States, Justices Ketanji Brown Jackson and Sonya Sotomayor took the rare step of issuing a written dissent of the Court’s denial of certiorari. Both justices are former criminal law attorneys—Justice Jackson was once an assistant public defender in Washington, D.C., and Justice Sotomayor was an assistant district attorney in Manhattan. As a result of the Court’s denial of certiorari, the ongoing circuit split means that an attorney’s failure to pursue a plea agreement may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the defendant’s Constitutional rights, but only in certain states.…

Continue Reading Supreme Court Declines to Resolve Circuit Split Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Supreme Court of the United States will decide an issue impacting charging decisions in criminal cases involving technology and where those cases are tried. Specifically, the Supreme Court will decide whether criminal defendants may be retried after they are convicted in the wrong “venue,” i.e., the location where the trial took place. This constitutional venue requirement—and the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision on the remedy for violating it—will influence future cases involving technology, where defendants, victims, servers, and resources used to commit the crime are often in different states or even nations.

In the case at issue, the defendant allegedly hacked into a company’s website, obtained certain trade secrets, and offered to sell those trade secrets through various posts on social media. As with many crimes involving technology today, numerous locations were involved: the defendant remained entirely within the Southern District of Alabama, the victim-company was in the Northern District of Florida, and the victim-company’s hacked servers were in the Middle District of Florida. But where to conduct the trial? Based on the location of the victim-company’s headquarters, the government decided (incorrectly) to indict the defendant in the Northern District of Florida, on three counts: violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, theft of trade secrets, and extortion. At the end of trial, the jury convicted the defendant of the latter two counts.

On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that for the trade-secrets conviction “venue was not proper in the Northern District of Florida because [the defendant] never committed any essential conduct in that location.” To remedy this violation, the court had two options: (1) vacate the conviction, allowing the defendant to be retried in a (supposedly) proper forum, or (2) acquit the defendant of his conviction in the improper forum, which would bar his retrial in another forum under the U.S. Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause that prohibits giving “the government . . . a second chance at prosecution.” The 11th Circuit chose the first option, endorsing a remedy that effectively allows the government, when it chooses the wrong venue, to retry a defendant in  the correct venue.…

Continue Reading Venue Misstep Shows Complexity of Prosecuting Cybercrime: Supreme Court to Weigh In

The U.S. Supreme Court is poised to issue what could be a monumental decision in the Court’s Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) jurisprudence as applied to the nation’s opioid epidemic. At issue in Ruan v. United States is the requisite intent the government must prove to convict a physician under the CSA for the unlawful distribution of controlled substances. 

The outcome in Ruan could have significant implications for prescribers, including whether their risk of criminal liability is actually higher than a narcotics trafficker distributing heroin or cocaine. More specifically, to convict a drug trafficker, federal prosecutors must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the trafficker knowingly and intentionally manufactured, transported, or distributed narcotics. If the government prevails in Ruan, the government would de facto have to show only that a prescribing physician was negligent in misprescribing opioids.

Concerns about ever-expanding prosecutorial discretion and the erosion of the criminal law’s traditional “guilty mind” requirement have focused significant attention on the case.

A Mini Survey of the CSA’s Statutory Scheme

Per the implementing regulations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), a physician may lawfully prescribe controlled substances only if they are prescribed for “a legitimate medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his professional practice.” Even a first-time offender could face decades in prison for misprescribing a Schedule II controlled substance, such as oxycodone, hydrocodone, hydromorphone, methadone, or fentanyl, in violation of the CSA.

The Government’s Case Against Dr. Ruan

In 2016, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Dr. Xiulu Ruan, a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)-registered pain management physician, with, among other things, “knowingly and unlawfully distribut[ing] and dispens[ing] . . . Schedule II Controlled Substances . . . outside the usual course of professional medical practice and not for a legitimate medical purpose, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1).”

The government at trial presented evidence that Dr. Ruan and his business partner issued nearly 300,000 controlled substance prescriptions in a four-year period. Some of these prescriptions allegedly were signed without Dr. Ruan even seeing the patient. The government also presented evidence that Dr. Ruan increased prescriptions of a biopharma company’s fentanyl drug a hundredfold after he and his business partner invested in it.…

Continue Reading Could It Be Easier to Convict a Doctor Than a Cartel Member? Why the Impending SCOTUS “Pill Mill” Ruling Makes Some Observers Nervous

On January 20, 2022, the U.S. Supreme Court held in an 8-1 opinion in Hemphill v. New York that Darrell Hemphill did not “open the door” to the admission of out-of-court third-party testimony by making it “arguably relevant to his theory of defense.” The Court further held that the admission of such testimony violated Hemphill’s rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause. The opinion will have practical significance for defense attorneys and prosecutors preparing for trial.  See Supreme Court to Weigh Protections Under Confrontation Clause.
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Continue Reading U.S. Supreme Court Rejects Argument That Defendant “Opened the Door” to Evidence That Violated Confrontation Clause

The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause provides criminal defendants with the right to “confront”—i.e., cross-examine—the witnesses against them.  But can a criminal defendant “open the door” to the admission of evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause?  The U.S. Supreme Court will address that question in Hemphill v. New York, scheduled for oral argument next month.  The outcome of that case may significantly expand when prosecutors at all levels, from local district attorneys’ offices to DOJ Main Justice, can overcome defendants’ right to exclude absent-witness testimony.

Darrell Hemphill was convicted of murder in New York after another man was unsuccessfully prosecuted for the same crime.  Hemphill argued at trial that the first suspect committed the crime.  That was enough for the trial court, and ultimately New York’s highest court, to determine he had opened the door for the prosecution to introduce evidence rebutting Hemphill’s claim—specifically, an out-of-court statement by the first man that he did not possess the type of gun responsible for the murder.

Federal and state rules of evidence like New York’s typically allow a party to introduce rebuttal testimony like this—even if it could not do so originally—if the opposing party puts the issue into play.  But Hemphill argues that the Confrontation Clause is a separate safeguard that cannot be overcome simply by opening the door.  Under Hemphill’s theory, the first man’s statement should not have been admitted, even after Hemphill implicated him for the crime, unless the man could also be cross-examined at trial.
Continue Reading Supreme Court to Weigh Protections Under Confrontation Clause

On June 22, 2020, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Liu v. SEC that in an SEC civil proceeding a disgorgement award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s profit and is awarded for victims is equitable relief permissible under the applicable statute. The opinion answers an important question left open by the Court in Kokesh v. SEC that disgorgement operates as a “penalty,” rendering claims for disgorgement subject to the five-year statute of limitations. See Supreme Court Reigns in SEC’s Disgorgement Power. Liu closes the door on speculation that the Court was poised to hold that the SEC did not have authority to seek disgorgement.
Continue Reading SEC Can Recover Disgorgement, With Limits

The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in United States v. McDonnell raised questions about the constitutionality of expansive interpretations of federal bribery statutes.  However, the bribery statute at issue in McDonnell—quid pro quo corruption defined at 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2)—is not the only bribery statute in federal prosecutors’ toolbox.  Since McDonnell was decided, federal prosecutors have increasingly relied on 18 U.S.C. § 666 to pursue bribery charges that might otherwise be precluded by McDonnell’s holding.
Continue Reading Second Circuit Affirms Broad Reading of Sec. 666 Bribery

The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a criminal case arising from a fraudulent scheme to cause massive gridlock at the George Washington Bridge in September 2013—otherwise known as the “Bridgegate” scandal. Bridget Anne Kelly, a staffer in then-Governor Chris Christie’s office, was convicted of wire fraud for her role in fabricating a fake traffic study and orchestrating lane reallocations as an act of political retaliation against a local mayor.

Affirming Kelly’s wire fraud conviction, the Third Circuit sustained the Government’s theory that Kelly and a fellow political operative fraudulently deprived the Port Authority of both physical property and intangible property, finding that the Port Authority has an “unquestionable” property interest in the Bridge’s traffic allocation and its public employee labor, and that the Port Authority has an intangible property interest in the public employees’ time and wages.
Continue Reading SCOTUS Considers Challenge to DOJ’s “Bridgegate” Theory

On June 21, 2018, the Supreme Court issued its highly anticipated opinion in Lucia v. SEC, finding that the manner in which the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) selects its “in-house” administrative law judges (ALJs) violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.  In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that ALJs are “inferior officers” and must be appointed by the president or head of the agency, rather than hired by SEC staff through the civil service process.  The immediate practical impact of the decision requires that petitioner Raymond Lucia be afforded a new hearing before “a properly appointed official.”

In recent years, capitalizing on what some commentators considered a “home court advantage” for enforcement actions, the SEC began favoring administrative proceedings in which agency ALJs serve as adjudicators rather than judicial proceedings in federal court.  An ALJ assigned to hear an SEC enforcement action has the power to issue an initial decision containing factual findings, legal conclusions, and appropriate remedies.  The Commission is not required to review the ALJ’s decision, and if it declines to review, the ALJ’s “initial” decision is deemed a final action of the Commission.  In practice, most ALJ initial decisions become final without any Commission review; for example, 2016 data revealed that 90% of SEC ALJ initial decisions were not reviewed by the Commission. …
Continue Reading SCOTUS Finds SEC ALJ Appointments Unconstitutional