Federal sentencing guidelines for economic crime have long been subject to criticism due to high dollar loss amounts that can produce eye-popping prison terms.

Adding to the fodder, a new report issued by the United States Sentencing Commission found that securities and investment fraud offenders received the longest average sentences under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines—more than twice as long as the average sentence for all economic crime offenders.  The report, What Does Federal Economic Crime Really Look Like?, analyzes sentences imposed under § 2B1.1 of the Guidelines, which is the section that applies to most financial fraud cases, including those involving securities, bank, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy.

The report is chock full of data, but one of the Commission’s big-picture findings was that the average sentences for 29 categories of economic crime vary significantly.  Not surprisingly, the report ties these variations to certain guideline enhancements, including loss amounts.  For example, the report notes that in 2017, the median loss amount for securities and investment fraud was $2,105,620, a loss amount that corresponds to a 16-level increase under the Guidelines.  This enhancement is substantially higher than any other specific offense type analyzed in the report.
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On December 26, 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) announced a settlement with communications technology firm Polycom, Inc. (“Polycom” or the “Company”) for violating the books and records and internal accounting controls provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) in connection with a scheme to bribe Chinese government officials. Under the settlement, Polycom agreed to pay the SEC approximately $12.5 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and a civil money penalty of $3.8 million. The Polycom settlement illustrates the liability that can arise from reliance on third-party agents such as distributors, but—as explored below—also presents a missed opportunity for the SEC to provide some clarifying guidance for companies looking to avoid similar outcomes.
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This series, written by recent in-house counsel and former federal prosecutors, aims to help in-house legal and compliance teams avoid the types of seemingly minor or inconsequential missteps that can lead to aggressive government responses, including parallel civil and criminal investigations.

In part two, the authors explain what to do when a search warrant

This series, written by recent in-house counsel and former federal prosecutors, takes a practical approach to helping in-house legal and compliance teams operating in a world of complex regulatory schemes and increased whistleblower activity.  It specifically aims to address how to avoid the types of seemingly minor or inconsequential missteps that can lead to aggressive

On June 28, 2018, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposed three rule changes to the Commission’s Whistleblower Program, including one that would authorize the SEC to “downward adjust” monetary awards in large actions for which an award might “exceed an amount that is reasonably necessary to advance the program’s goals”—in the view of the Commission.  The proposed change prompted an immediate response from Commissioner Kara Stein who issued a separate Statement on Proposed Amendments to the Commission’s Whistleblower Program Rules (“Statement”) in which she highlights concerns that a move towards a more subjective standard in determining monetary awards could threaten a whistleblower’s incentive to come forward, given the added uncertainty in outcome.  Additionally, Stein questions whether the SEC has the statutory authority under the Dodd-Frank Act to alter the rules impacting awards in this way.    
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On May 9, 2018, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion in United States v. Kolsuz, holding that the Fourth Amendment requires individualized suspicion for forensic searches of cell phones seized at the border.

In so holding, the Fourth Circuit provides important clarification about how the Fourth Amendment applies to border searches of electronic devices. But, both in the Fourth Circuit and in jurisdictions across the country, critical questions remain unanswered about the scope of the Fourth Amendment in this context.

Source: ACLU.org

The Decision

In United States v. Kolsuz, federal customs agents found firearm parts in the checked luggage of an airport traveler and then detained him as he was attempting to board an international flight. Subsequently, and without a warrant, agents seized his cell phone and “subjected it to a month-long, off-site forensic analysis, yielding a nearly 900-page report cataloging the phone’s data.” Based in part on this information, the traveler was eventually convicted of, among other things, attempting to smuggle firearms out of the country.

On appeal of his conviction, the traveler challenged the denial of his motion to suppress the forensic analysis of his cell phone as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.

In addressing the issue, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that government agents may perform “routine” searches at international borders, or their functional equivalents, without a warrant or individualized suspicion consistent with the Fourth Amendment. But, the Court recognized that even at the border certain “non-routine,” “highly intrusive” searches require individualized suspicion.

Ultimately, the court held that forensic searches of digital devices, like the one at issue in that case, qualify as such “non-routine” searches and are thus prohibited absent some level of individualized suspicion.

The Court’s holding was based, in part, upon its determination that forensic analysis of a digital device can “reveal an unparalleled breadth” of “private,” “sensitive” information. It was also based on the Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v. California, which recognized the strong privacy interests associated with electronic devices. There, the Supreme Court held that a warrant is required to search a cell phone seized incident to arrest because of the private, extensive information contained on such devices.

Notably, however, the Fourth Circuit did not decide whether the requisite level of suspicion for such forensic searches is reasonable suspicion, or something more (like a warrant supported by probable cause). It also had no occasion to decide the requisite level of suspicion for officers to conduct “manual” searches, where agents review the content of electronic devices without the help of forensic technology.

Other Case Law, Open Questions
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Last month, a D.C. federal judge ordered the Department of Justice to turn over the names of prospective monitors nominated to oversee the corporate compliance programs of fifteen companies found to be in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).  While recognizing that these individuals have “more than a de minimis privacy interest in their anonymity,” the court found that any such privacy interest was outweighed by the public’s interest in learning their identities.

In April 2015, journalist Dylan Tokar filed a FOIA request seeking records related to the review and selection of corporate compliance monitors in FCPA settlement agreements between DOJ and fifteen corporate defendants.  Tokar, a reporter for the trade publication Just Anti-Corruption, hoped these records would shed light on the monitor selection process, including whether DOJ had been abiding by the guidelines for monitor selection set forth in its 2008 Morford Memorandum.  The Memorandum, which establishes several principles to avoid potential and actual conflicts of interest and address concerns of cronyism, prescribes the consideration of “at least three qualified monitor candidates” whenever practicable.  Accordingly, Tokar requested the names of the three monitor candidates and their associated firms for fifteen cases.

More than eighteen months later, DOJ provided Tokar with a table purportedly responding to his request, but redacted the names of the monitor candidates who were nominated but not selected, as well as their affiliated firms in some cases.  DOJ asserted that these redactions were necessary and justified under FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C), which exempt from disclosure certain information that would constitute an “unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”

After both parties cross-moved for summary judgment, the court concluded that the redactions were improper and ordered DOJ to release the candidates’ names.  It found that while DOJ had demonstrated sufficient privacy interests to warrant coverage under Exemptions 6 and 7(C)—as it was “plausible that these individuals would prefer to have their consideration and ultimate[] non-selection withheld from the public’s view”—these interests were outweighed by the public’s interest in disclosure.  The court agreed with Tokar that without disclosure of the candidates’ names, it would be “difficult (if not impossible) to know whether either the government or the corporate entity under investigation is taking advantage of the selection process in a manner that undermines the objectives of the DPA” and the principles delineated in the Morford Memorandum.
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On February 21, 2018, in Class v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that a defendant who pleads guilty can still raise on appeal any constitutional claim that does not depend on challenging his or her “factual guilt.”  The Court’s holding preserves a federal criminal defendant’s ability to challenge the constitutionality of the statute underlying his or her conviction, even in the event of a guilty plea.  In other words, where the appellate claim implicates “the very power of the State” to prosecute the defendant, a guilty plea alone cannot bar it. 
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There will be little debate that this has been a bad day for the state-sanctioned (and regulated) marijuana industry.  The Obama-era directives that significantly fettered the discretion of U.S. attorneys to bring federal narcotics charges against marijuana growers, distributors and possessors in states that “legalized” marijuana for medicinal or recreational purposes are now a thing

As cybersecurity concerns move more companies to batten down employee use of external email accounts and other websites through blocking software and other measures, the DOJ’s recently issued FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy—now incorporated in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual—unequivocally states that companies seeking full cooperation credit from DOJ in FCPA cases must ensure that employees are prohibited “from using software that generates but does not appropriately retain business records or communications,” among other business-record retention measures.  Even setting aside the difficulties in policing “old” technology such as personal email accounts and text messaging on employee-owned devices, the constant evolution and emergence of new electronic messaging platforms will undoubtedly create significant challenges for companies seeking to satisfy DOJ’s expectations.
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